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Introduction 
 
 
Identity and Violence in Ukraine 
Societal Developments since the Maidan Protests 
Steffen Halling and Susan Stewart 
Since the Maidan protests erupted at the end of 2013 Ukrainian society has witnessed 
a deep transformation, in which polarising as well as consolidating tendencies can be 
identified. The “Revolution of Dignity” and Russia’s violation of the country’s territorial 
integrity have strengthened Ukrainian identity in a way that has enhanced social cohe-
sion. But these developments and the accompanying violence have at the same time 
heightened pre-existing conflicts. Only a lasting stabilisation can prevent these social 
fractures from widening yet further. To that end Ukrainian and external actors will need 
to engage in processes of conflict management and social reconciliation. 
 
While Ukraine has in many respects become 
a different society since the Maidan, its 
political actors pay little heed to the impli-
cations of these changes. As well as setting 
the stage for future difficulties in the post-
war phase, the transformation is already 
affecting how the growing number of in-
ternally displaced persons (IDPs) is treated 
and deepening the rift between the Donbas 
and the rest of Ukraine. 
Consolidation through the Maidan 
The Maidan movement established a con-
sensus concerning shared goals (such as 
effective action against corruption) and 
an idea of solidarity among citizens that 
extended across large parts of Ukrainian 
society. Its determined opposition to the 
regime of President Viktor Yanukovych 
was decisive, striking a chord with a large 
proportion of the Ukrainian population – 
even in the east, where support for Yanu-
kovych had plummeted in the course of his 
presidency. However, most of the Maidan 
participants came either from Kyiv itself or 
from the western and central regions, and 
largely ignored the significantly greater in-
difference or even resistance to their move-
ment in the east and south. This contributed 
to the ability of the so-called separatists in 
the Donbas to rely – at least at the begin-
ning – on a certain degree of support among 
the population there. And the movement in 
Kyiv tended to class protesters in the east, 
who saw themselves – in terms of their dis-
satisfaction and the methods they used – in 
the Maidan tradition, more as adversaries 
than as allies. 
The consolidating moment of the Mai-
dan brought forth a civil society movement 
that today strives not merely to replace 
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(some of) the elites, but to achieve lasting 
change in the political and economic 
system. The movement comprises many 
different organisations and loose group-
ings, most of which only emerged in the 
course of the Maidan. One representative 
example is the “Reanimation Package of 
Reforms”, an alliance of individuals and 
NGOs working to stimulate the reform pro-
cess and monitor the implementation of 
adopted measures. In this regard the will 
of civil society and political actors to co-
operate with one another is crucial. While 
individual parliamentarians and govern-
ment officials maintain good relations 
with representatives of civil society, many 
politicians and civil servants are extremely 
sceptical about involving such actors in the 
political process. The newly emerged groups 
also find it difficult to coordinate sensibly 
and effectively with their allies in the re-
gions, because the new actors in the capital 
still have to learn how to cooperate closely, 
while the civil society structures in the 
regions are significantly weaker. Despite 
these difficulties, there is steadily growing 
cooperation between Kyiv and the regions 
and between individual regions. At the 
same time, a number of the more promi-
nent activists are now members of the 
Ukrainian parliament, where they seek 
to influence politics from within. 
Societal Divisions 
As well as consolidating Ukrainian society, 
the Maidan also brought to light a number 
of differences. Many still refer to it as the 
“Euromaidan”, because it began as a protest 
against President Yanukovych’s refusal to 
sign an Association Agreement with the 
European Union. Many Maidan participants 
believed that opposition to Yanukovych and 
support for the EU convergence process were 
inseparable, because it would have been 
impossible to implement the values repre-
sented by the European Union under a 
regime like his. But not all opponents of 
the former regime followed that logic, and 
some expressed great scepticism about the 
European Union even during the Maidan 
protests. 
Attitudes towards the European Union 
have grown even more complex in the 
interim. Support for joining the European 
Union has grown since the Maidan, if only 
because Moscow’s actions in Crimea and 
the Donbas have made the alternative – 
cooperation with Russia in the Eurasian 
Economic Union framework – a great deal 
less attractive, if not inconceivable. At the 
same time there has also been increasing 
disappointment with the European Union, 
whose response to Russia’s aggression has 
been perceived as weak and inadequate. 
This applies in particular to the military 
aspect: Many Ukrainians feel that if the 
West acknowledges that the conflict is 
about more than just Ukraine and affects 
the security of Europe as a whole, it should 
also be willing to participate militarily, 
if not directly then at least by supplying 
defensive weaponry. There is also deep-
rooted suspicion that the European Union 
and especially Germany might be willing 
to make a deal with Russia at Ukraine’s 
expense. 
A second polarising element of the Mai-
dan concerns the politics of history. The 
Kyiv protests included many participants 
who view the era of Soviet rule as purely 
negative. This interpretation of history, 
which is especially prevalent in western 
Ukraine, came to be symbolised by the 
large-format portrait of the nationalist 
partisan Stepan Bandera that was promi-
nently displayed throughout the active 
phase of the Maidan protests. Bandera 
(1909–1959) is celebrated as an independ-
ence fighter and national hero in western 
Ukraine, but despised as a traitor and Nazi 
collaborator in the south and east. Some 
Ukrainians became persuaded that the 
Maidan was a gathering of “Bandera fol-
lowers”, an image avidly propagated by 
official Russian media. These diverging 
perceptions have a polarising effect and 
hinder reconciliation between parts of the 
eastern population and the rest of society. 
Differences over the Soviet past are also 
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found within eastern Ukraine, however, as 
evidenced for example by the controversy 
over the destruction of the Lenin statue in 
Kharkiv in September 2014. 
A Growing Culture of Violence 
Although the protests began peacefully, 
violence was increasingly used on both 
sides of the barricades after Berkut special 
forces attacked demonstrators at the end 
of November 2013. The participation of 
Maidan supporters in violent clashes has 
raised a series of questions with which 
society has yet to deal, relating inter alia to 
the myth of a peaceful Ukrainian nation 
and the legitimacy of violence as a means 
of addressing conflict. 
The presence of a volunteer security 
force on the Maidan, many of them from 
military backgrounds, contributed to 
keeping the protest well-organised and 
solving the practical problems that arise 
where large numbers of demonstrators 
occupy a crowded public space. While few 
of the Maidan supporters questioned the 
use of violence by their own side, at least in 
response to attacks by government forces, 
the events on the Maidan ultimately paved 
the way for a culture of violence that for 
example facilitated the emergence of vol-
unteer battalions originally located outside 
the regular command structures of the inte-
rior and defence ministries. One indication 
of growing brutalisation is the practice of 
“trash bin justice”, a kind of informal lus-
tration where protestors dump unpopular 
politicians and officials in rubbish bins. 
Such phenomena encourage the acceptance 
of violence within society and make it more 
difficult to return to a peaceful normality. 
By inflaming suspicions that parts of Ukrain-
ian society are fundamentally hostile to 
the population of the Donbas, they can also 
hinder reconciliation processes. 
The partly violent protests that broke out 
at the end of 2014 in the regional capitals 
Zaporizhzhia and Vinnytsia were apparent-
ly driven by a symbiosis of attention-seeking 
political forces – the Radical Party and the 
Svoboda Party – and demonstrators frus-
trated that the impact of the Maidan had 
not yet reached their region, especially at 
the level of the cadres. The violent elements 
of the Kyiv movement seem to have habitu-
ated some of its supporters to the idea of 
violence as a legitimate means of political 
protest. Moreover, Ukrainians find them-
selves confronted with violence and its ef-
fects on a daily basis in their own country, 
whether directly in the fighting in eastern 
Ukraine, through encounters with IDPs and 
returning soldiers, or via media reports. 
The present developments reveal that 
Ukrainian society (including the elite) has 
failed during the twenty-four years since 
independence to learn to deal productively 
with conflicts or to resolve them through 
sustainable compromises. Looking ahead, 
there is therefore a danger that parts of 
society will follow the many examples from 
2014 where violence was used in response 
to conflicts. This risk is greatest if funda-
mental economic and social reforms are 
not realised, or if their implementation 
leads to a significant deterioration in living 
standards. Especially if the elites escape 
suffering or are even seen to profit from 
reforms, the risk of violent protest is great. 
At the same time, few actors in Ukraine 
are in a position to counteract the culture 
of violence. While awareness of the prob-
lem is growing, for example in church 
circles, the few initiatives for action to date 
have come almost exclusively from a civil 
society that is already overstretched with 
other tasks (supporting the army, caring for 
IDPs and promoting reforms). Especially 
with regard to IDPs, organised groups with-
in society have already taken over some of 
the functions of the state. State representa-
tives are not generally capable of assessing 
the consequences of the violence for society 
and initiating suitable responses, such as 
providing free psychological counselling. 
There is also a dearth of actors offering 
the resources required to help others come 
to terms with the violence they have em-
ployed or experienced. 
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Identity and Patriotism 
Elements of consolidation have also 
emerged due to the repeated and ongoing 
violation of the country’s territorial integ-
rity. One clear indication of this is the 
observed strengthening of a Ukrainian 
identity whose principal point of reference 
is national sovereignty. Surveys show that 
the Ukrainian population’s emotional con-
nection to the nation increased sharply in 
the course of 2014; one can certainly speak 
of an acceleration of the Ukrainian nation-
building process. While pro-Ukrainian atti-
tudes are more prevalent in the western, 
central and northern parts of the country 
than in the east and south, it should be 
noted that a majority of Ukrainians in all 
these areas identify with the Ukrainian 
state and support its independence. In fact, 
the strongest growth in pro-Ukrainian atti-
tudes is found in the eastern parts of the 
country, where more than two thirds of the 
population now favour Ukrainian state-
hood. 
This underlines how regional differences 
have as a whole declined in importance 
in the course of the crisis, and that despite 
regional specifics Ukrainian society is today 
more united than before. Whether a par-
ticular group prefers to speak Ukrainian or 
Russian plays a subordinate role here. This 
emerging new national consensus is asso-
ciated with growing approval for European 
integration, whereas support for joining 
the Eurasian Economic Union has fallen 
steadily in recent months. Before the begin-
ning of the Maidan protests in November 
2013, 41 percent supported EU member-
ship, while 38 percent were in favour of 
joining the Russian-led Customs Union. 
One year later, in November 2014, the gap 
had widened to 64 versus 17 percent. 
However, the strengthening of national 
identity and patriotism in the country as 
a whole is contradicted by a development 
observed above all in the areas directly 
affected by the fighting, the Donetsk and 
Luhansk regions. The population of the 
Donbas has a particularly strong regional 
identity founded primarily on social charac-
teristics, whereas ethnic and national cat-
egories have been secondary in the past. 
Support for Ukrainian independence was 
correspondingly much less deeply rooted in 
this region. Although rejection of Ukraini-
an statehood has fallen here too, above all 
during 2014, the proportion of those who 
are neither for nor against Ukrainian inde-
pendence has significantly increased. Even 
before 2014 the population of the Donbas 
had an ambivalent relationship with the 
Ukrainian nation-state. The last credible 
surveys from summer 2014 show approxi-
mately one third of the population respec-
tively supporting, rejecting or remaining 
neutral/undecided on Ukrainian statehood. 
At the same time, the Donbas is the only 
region where a relative majority (45 per-
cent) favour the Russian-led Customs Union. 
It is in itself nothing new to find diverg-
ing attitudes on fundamental questions of 
Ukrainian statehood in the Donbas, espe-
cially given the increasing political instru-
mentalisation of supposed regional and 
ethnic/cultural differences during the past 
ten years. But the population had not hith-
erto experienced violent clashes between 
“pro-Russian” and “pro-Ukrainian” demon-
strators of the kind witnessed in March 2014 
in Donetsk. Even if Russia is primarily re-
sponsible for the escalation since then, the 
population of the Donbas in particular has 
been exposed to a stark societal polarisation 
that both prepared fertile ground for and 
reinforced external propaganda and dis-
information. The conflict potential that 
became visible after the Maidan, which runs 
mainly along ideological lines, has inevitably 
intensified in the course of the fighting. 
Whilst other regions have been less 
affected by societal polarisation of this 
kind, cities like Odessa and Kharkiv also 
demonstrated that diverging political views 
harbour potential for violence as well as 
conflict. Both were repeatedly hit by terror-
ist attacks in 2014, including a bombing 
at an anniversary commemoration of the 
Maidan revolution in Kharkiv. These regions 
thus remain susceptible to political sub-
version and instrumentalisation. 
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War and Its Consequences 
The “Anti-Terror-Operation” conducted by 
the Ukrainian government since May 2014 
meets with a heterogeneous response with-
in the population. In summer 2014 a major-
ity of 54 percent wanted to see the operation 
ended and the conflict resolved through 
dialogue and compromise, while 34 per-
cent supported continuing it. But attitudes 
hardened over the course of the autumn 
after attempts to bring about a cease-fire 
failed while the Moscow-supported separat-
ists made territorial gains. In October 53 
percent still were calling for a cease-fire to 
be negotiated with the leaders of the self-
appointed “people’s republics”, but in No-
vember the figure fell to 43 percent, while 
the proportion calling for the peace talks to 
be abandoned grew from 22 to 36 percent. 
Where there have been public criticism 
and isolated protests, these have not been 
directed against the military operations as 
such. Instead the political leadership has 
been accused of failure, for example in 
protecting and equipping conscripts and 
volunteers. As far as attitudes towards the 
military operation are concerned, surveys 
also reveal regional differences: the closer 
to the warzone, the greater the rejection 
of military means and the stronger the sup-
port for dialogue. However, the population 
regards the self-appointed “people’s repub-
lics” of Donetsk and Luhansk as a product 
of Russian aggression rather than as genuine 
representatives of those living there. It is 
above all this perception that feeds Ukrain-
ian society’s fundamental approval for the 
actions of its government. 
In fact, even in the affected regions the 
armed separatists have to date received 
little in the way of active support from the 
population. Participation in so-called refer-
endums on independence from Ukraine 
held in parts of the Donbas in May 2014 
should be understood above all as a protest 
against what was felt to be inadequate heed 
for the interests of the regions in the Maidan 
movement. But no concrete demands were 
formulated. Instead, parts of the Donbas 
population articulated a general dissatis-
faction with a socio-economic situation that 
had arisen over the course of years. More-
over, propaganda and other types of Russian 
influence fanned massive fears about sup-
posed right-wing extremists. 
However, the continuing fighting, in 
which both sides have been willing to tol-
erate a significant number of civilian cas-
ualties, has inevitably consolidated the 
mistrust that already existed in the Donbas 
towards Kyiv and the existence of supposed-
ly radical pro-Ukrainian attitudes. While 
most of the Ukrainian population under-
stood the military operations to be directed 
against the resistance of Russian “terrorists”, 
the inhabitants of the directly affected 
regions may come to precisely the opposite 
conclusion. The perceptions of the popula-
tion in the area controlled by the separat-
ists are shaped above all by months of 
exposure to exclusively (pro-)Russian propa-
ganda. Personal experience of violence, 
propagandistic instrumentalisation of 
civilian victims and the publicly flaunted 
use of torture against prisoners of war have 
caused grave harm to relations between 
different sections of Ukrainian society. 
Certain measures introduced by Kyiv, 
such as stopping payment of pensions 
and other benefits and the introduction 
of a travel permit regime to prevent more 
separatist forces infiltrating into the non-
occupied areas, must also be questioned in 
this context. While it was initially possible 
to pass the checkpoints without major 
difficulties, principally to collect cash and 
have pensions paid, in recent weeks it has 
become much more difficult for residents 
of separatist-controlled areas to leave. This 
also cements the existing front line as a de 
facto frontier. At the same time, increasing 
war-weariness is leading to growing calls 
within Ukraine to let the Donbas go. 
Enormous movements of IDPs create a 
further strain on social cohesion, with 
numbers from the war-afflicted eastern 
regions increasing steadily as the fighting 
continues. Alongside about twenty thou-
sand from Crimea, well over one million 
IDPs from the Donbas were registered by 
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the middle of March 2015. Most of them 
now reside in the directly adjoining areas 
under Ukrainian control, in the regions 
bordering the Donbas (Kharkiv, Dniprope-
trovsk, Zaporizhzhia), in the Odessa region 
or in the capital Kyiv. Especially during 
the cold part of the year, providing proper 
housing for these people represents an 
almost insurmountable challenge. Given 
that many do not register at all, the Office 
of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
believes that the true numbers are con-
siderably larger. 
The IDPs have to date mainly been seek-
ing temporary protection from the dangers 
of war, and it can be assumed that most 
will wish to return home. This is particular-
ly likely to be the case for pensioners, who 
represent the overwhelming majority of 
IDPs in the areas around the war zone. 
But fighting and ongoing instability in the 
region are likely to make a quick return 
impossible in most cases. In view of the 
deteriorating economic situation in the 
country there is therefore a risk of resource-
related conflicts, for example over housing 
and public services. Those from the Donbas 
may also suffer stigmatisation on the basis 
of suspicion of lack of patriotism or (at least 
passive) support of separatism. Above all, 
political conflicts could occur in the regions 
that accept particularly large numbers of 
IDPs. The question of how to deal with active 
or passive support of military separatism 
on a legal and especially on a societal level 
is also likely to arise. This is a question that 
affects the social cohesion of the country 
as a whole and must therefore be clarified 
above and beyond the regions directly 
affected by the fighting. 
Society as a Crucial Actor 
It was activists from Ukrainian society who 
sparked the Maidan movement in Novem-
ber 2013, and organised parts of society 
today make a decisive contribution to sup-
plying the Ukrainian army with the equip-
ment it needs and caring for steadily grow-
ing numbers of IDPs. Through its future 
behaviour society will also help to deter-
mine whether Ukraine engages in success-
ful reforms. 
Yet the role of Ukrainian society is often 
neglected, by external actors as well as 
by the country’s elites. In fact, a stronger 
awareness of societal attitudes could be 
helpful in generating realistic demands and 
expectations with which to approach Kyiv. 
Such deeper insights would also assist Ger-
many and the European Union to locate 
allies within Ukrainian (civil) society who 
could help to advance the reform process. 
This would make it easier to identify the 
risks and opportunities that will influence 
developments in Ukraine in the coming 
months. A more profound understanding 
of societal trends and potential lines of con-
flict could also be useful for OSCE observers 
on the ground in Ukraine in their inter-
actions with local actors, as well as on the 
level of strategic planning. 
Recognition of the potential of Ukrain-
ian civil society and the wish do more to 
promote it are certainly present in the Ger-
man context. The best proof of this is the 
special funding approved by the Bundestag 
for German organisations to carry out 
projects at (civil) society level with partners 
from Ukraine or other countries of the East-
ern Partnership (EaP). These funds, adminis-
tered by the German Foreign Ministry, have 
been increased from €5 million in 2014 to 
€14 million in 2015.The special funds are 
suitable for financing projects in the fields 
of conflict transformation and societal 
reconciliation. But the funding is too short-
term in nature to generate credible sustain-
ability. It would therefore make sense to 
consider how these monies could be linked 
to other longer-term funding sources, since 
projects working towards reconciliation 
must be medium- to long-term if they are 
to have any prospect of success. 
On the EU level there has been a signifi-
cant amount of rhetorical as well as sub-
stantive support for Ukrainian civil society 
in past years. The Eastern Partnership’s 
Civil Society Forum has provided opportu-
nities for Ukraine and other EaP countries 
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to provide input from civil society actors 
into Brussels policy processes, as well as to 
network with their counterparts from other 
states in the region and some EU member 
states as well. However, while the EU has 
increasingly acknowledged the need to 
assist civil society development in Ukraine 
and has acted accordingly, the potential of 
forming a tandem between the EU and civil 
society actors in Ukraine to induce the 
Ukrainian political and economic elite to 
carry out genuine reforms has not yet been 
realised. A much more systematic network 
of contacts would be necessary to ensure 
that Brussels institutions and Ukrainian 
NGOs are effectively pooling their efforts 
to push for reform.  
This can also apply in part to the field 
of societal reconciliation, in which greater 
awareness in Brussels of efforts by Ukrain-
ian organisations can enable the EU to alert 
members of the Ukrainian elite to the prob-
lems generated by societal tensions and the 
potential solutions offered by its own (civil) 
society. Furthermore, a heightened under-
standing of societal trends and concerns 
in Brussels can help EU officials tailor their 
approach to Ukraine in a more realistic 
and appropriate manner. This fits in well 
with the emerging consensus around 
stronger differentiation according to coun-
try within the Eastern Partnership, as re-
flected for example in the Joint Consulta-
tion Paper “Towards a new European Neigh-
bourhood Policy” issued by the European 
Commission and the High Representative 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on 
4 March 2015.  
As in the fields of politics and economy, 
Ukraine has missed many opportunities 
to promote social cohesion in the past two 
decades. The Maidan and the events in 
Crimea and the Donbas have now initiated 
and accelerated diverse processes of change 
in society. While these have contributed 
to consolidating a Ukrainian identity, they 
have also deepened existing fault lines 
between the Donbas and other parts of the 
country. Moreover, violence has also become 
at least more commonplace as a means for 
dealing with conflict, and perhaps more 
accepted as well. 
The handling of these problems in the 
coming months and years will help deter-
mine the strength or weakness of the 
Ukrainian state. It will be important to sen-
sitise political actors in the country to these 
questions. Here their contacts in Germany 
and the European Union have a contribu-
tion to make. It is equally important to en-
courage and concretely support the small 
but growing number of (civil) society actors 
working on processes of conflict transfor-
mation and reconciliation. The actual form 
of assistance will differ from case to case, 
and will need to be continuously re-nego-
tiated between those involved to reflect 
the rapidly changing situation. This makes 
tackling these questions a significant but 
worthwhile challenge, and one where the 
interaction between political and societal 
actors will be decisive. 
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